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Abstract— The concept of Secret Unknown Ciphers SUCs was 
introduced a decade ago as a new visionary concept without devising 
practical real-world examples. The major contribution of this work 
is to show the feasibility of “self-mutating” unknown cipher-
modules for physical security applications in a non-volatile FPGA 
environment. The mutated devices may then serve as clone-resistant 
physical units. The mutated unpredictable physical digital modules 
represent consistent and low-cost physical identity alternatives to 
the traditional analog Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs).  
PUFs were introduced two decades ago as unclonable analog 
physical identities which are relatively complex and suffer from 
operational inconsistencies. We present a novel and practical SUC-
creation technique based on pre-compiled cipher-layout-templates 
in FPGAs. A devised bitstream-manipulator serves as “mutation 
generator” to randomly-manipulate the bitstream without violating 
the FPGA design rules.  Two large cipher classes (class-size larger 
than 21000) are proposed with optimally designed structure for a non-
volatile FPGA fabric structure. The cipher-mutation process is just 
a simple random unknown-cipher-selection by consulting the 
FPGA’s internal True Random Number Generator (TRNG). The 
security levels and qualities of the proposed ciphers are evaluated. 
The attained security levels are scalable and even adaptable to the 
post-quantum cryptography. The hardware and software 
complexities of the created SUCs are experimentally prototyped in 
a real field FPGA technology to show very promising results.  
 
Index Terms—Digital PUFs, secret unknown cipher, 
identification protocols, self-reconfiguration, SoC non-volatile 
FPGA, pseudo-random functions, pseudo-random permutation, 
cryptanalysis, template-based SUC creation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE majority of contemporary systems require physically 
hard to clone (non-replaceable) modules as security 
anchors. Physical(ly) Unclonable Functions (PUFs) were 
proposed to serve as such anchors [1][2][3]. PUFs were  
deployed in many applications such as secure memoryless key 
storage [4] and as unclonable entity identifiers [5][6]. However, 
PUFs drawbacks and their high complexity limited so far, their 
practical usage especially in automotive and consumer mass-
products. 
Emerging VLSI self-reconfiguration capabilities inspired the 
authors a decade ago to introduce a concept for self-creating 
“electronically-mutating” irreversibly unknown hard-wired 
ciphers in VLSI devices in a post-fabrication process [7]. The 
reader may wonder whether an unknown cipher in a device 
makes sense at all. Or ask fundamentally about the use of  
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ciphers which nobody knows? Many use-cases for such ciphers 
were shown in making devices physically unclonable or clone-
resistant for a large class of IoTs applications [8] [9] [10].  
This work demonstrates for the first time one not ultimate 
however, possible practical approach towards creating such 
ciphers in real-field non-volatile FPGA devices. The expected 
possible realization approaches for unknown ciphers seem to be 
unlimited. Admittedly, FPGA fabrics allowing even the 
proposed approach do not contemporarily exist however are 
expected to emerge soon. This work was presented first in [11]. 
As the concept of unknown ciphers is not well known in the 
common literature, and to make the paper self-contained, the 
key ideas of the visionary unknown cipher concept are 
summarized in section II. 
Contributions: The main contributions of this work can be 
summarized as follows: First, showing that creating unknown 
ciphers in VLSI technology is a feasible task. Second, a novel 
and efficient concept for embedding a practical self-
reconfiguring-manipulator in SoC FPGAs is proposed. It is 
based on creating cipher-templates in the fabric and NV-
memory and internal bitstream manipulators without violating 
the FPGA design rules. Third, two new large classes (class size 
≈ 21234 and 21350) of random ciphers adapted to best-fit into the 
non-volatile SoC FPGAs fabric structure are presented. The 
created cipher in a device is considered as unknown as an 
internal true random generator is ensuring to select just one 
unknown choice out of 21234/21350 ciphers. Fourth, the resulting 
unknown ciphers are shown to be secure against most classical 
attacks and being scalable even for post-quantum cryptography 
with adequate complexity. The implementation complexity is 
evaluated by sample prototyping in Microsemi SmartFusion®2 
SoC FPGA technology, showing the feasibility and efficiency 
of the concept and the required FPGA bitstream controller 
changes to allow such self-creation process. 
II. THE NEW PARADIGM OF MUTATING UNKNOWN CIPHERS 
The term “Unknown-Cipher” seems for the first moment as 
a contradiction, as at least the one who designed the cipher 
should know it? The authors postulated that the emerging VLSI 
technology would allow practical self-creation of unknown 
entities and introduced a first visionary bio-inspired mutation 
process within VLSI devices that was called a “digital 
mutation” in [7]. Such intended mutations (hypermutations for 
immunity), should allow creating permanent unknown 
cryptographic entities such as secrets ciphers or hash functions 
etc. within VLSI devices [12][13] in a post-fabrication process. 
To attain such usable unknown functions, a smart infrastructure 
with self-reconfiguration capability in non-volatile (NV) FPGA 
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environment is then required.  Such technologies do not yet 
really exist. However, are expected to emerge in a near future 
VLSI devices. The following key-concepts are presented as 
backgrounds for the secret unknown cryptography. 
A. Unknown-Ciphers Paradigm and Kerckhoffs’s Principle  
A traditional secret is something known to somebody as a 
privilege allowing that person to have exclusive access rights. 
Such secret can be willingly duplicated and forwarded to 
another entity to share that privileged access. If a secret is not 
known like a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF), then it 
should be physically forwarded to allow privilege sharing. In 
that case, the privileged-owner would lose his or her access 
rights. PUFs are born natural properties which are somehow 
equivalent to weak unknown hash functions. To our knowledge, 
there are no natural physically born unknown ciphers 
(permutations) such as PUFs. Our visionary concept in 
unknown cryptography is to create unknown ciphers. The 
concept of unknown ciphers is not to be confused with 
“obscured ciphers”. Therefore, the proposed unknown cipher or 
possibly unknown cryptographic functions should not lead to 
“security by obscurity”. Kerckhoffs’s principle assumes that 
any used ciphers are impossible to be kept secret and the only 
secrets are the keys shared by both communicating parties.  
We postulate that the only perfect secret or cryptographic-
function is the one which nobody knows or capable to predict. 
Therefore, attacking such secrets is equivalent to an exhaustive 
search over the whole possible keys and/or functions space. We 
expect that VLSI technology would reach soon the capability to 
create practical entities incorporating “unpredictable” unknown 
cryptographic functions. We start with the attempt to set 
concepts for creating secret unknown ciphers SUCs. 
A Secret Unknown Cipher SUC: If a cipher is designed by a 
cryptographer and is then kept secret in production, then this 
leads to the typical case of “Security by Obscurity”. Such cases 
failed so far practically in all known applications as the security 
concepts violate Kerckhoffs’s principle. However, if the cipher 
creator/generator itself cannot predict the generated cipher, then 
the cipher is deemed as not known.  
Bounds on Unknown Ciphers: The unpredictability of a 
designed cipher is upper bounded. A secret unknown cipher 
(SUC) of n-to-n bits is seen to be perfectly created, if it is a non-
predictable (unknown) choice out of all possible 2n! n-bit 
permutations. To get an idea about the huge space of that 
cipher-choice for a small n as n=10. The number of all possible 
invertible 10-to-10 bits mappings including trivial cases is 2n! 
= 1024! ≈ 28192 choices. 
Interesting VLSI-FPFA-specific practical examples: 
1. Constructing four 4-LUTs as (4-to-4 bits mapping) allows a 
total of 264 possible mappings. Only 
4 442 ! 2  of them are 
invertible permutation functions or ciphers including all 
trivial cases. About 220 of them are known as useful optimal 
4-bit S-Boxes for crypto mappings! 
2. A 6-to-6-bit mapping allows 
6 2962 ! 2  possible invertible 
mappings/ciphers which may be accommodated within a 
very small FPGA cell structure. 
3. A traditional cipher of 64-to-64 bits has a cardinality space 
of about 
7064 22 ! 2   possible ciphers. 
B. Are Secret Unknown Ciphers (SUCs) Creatable? 
SUC creation seems to be a very challenging task however, 
not impossible. One objective of this paper is to show the 
feasibility of their practical realization in view of technology 
progress. 
Assume that a NV FPGA would allow internal self-
reconfiguration. Fig. 1 shows a generic SUC creation concept. 
A single-event process triggers a True Random Generator 
TRNG leading to select/create randomly one unpredictable and 
unknown cipher Cj from a large class of a cipher-data-base {C1, 
C2 … CS} having S possible ciphers. For generality, a secret 
unknown key Zi may be similarly also created. After this single-
event process, all dashed entities in Fig. 1 are then irreversibly 
deleted and should never be possible to act again.  
The resulting cipher is a secret, however unknown and a non-
repeatable selection. It is even unknown to the cipher designer 
himself. Therefore, the designation Secret Unknown Cipher 
(SUC). Notice that for the functionality of the concept, no need 
to publish the SUC creation program of the cipher-class which 
is designated later as the GENIE. In worst case, according to 
Kerckhoffs’s principle, the GENIE is considered as published. 
Notice that the GENIE is fully seeded by the non-predictable 
bits of a True Random Number Generator (TRNG).  
TRNG
SoC non-Volatile FPGA
C1 C2 C3 Cj CS-1 CS… …
S = Cipher Class 
Cardinality  is upper 
bounded by
Smax = 2
n!
Large Ciphers Data Base
Cj
Created
Secret Unknown Cipher
SUC
Zi
GENIE
S Ciphers
 
Fig. 1. Key Concept for Creating a Secret Unknown Cipher SUC 
C. SUC Security and Clonability Bounds 
Selecting unpredictable key Zi from the TRNG output bitstream 
is basically a trivial process. However, designing unpredictable 
operational cipher is a very challenging task. The following 
objectives represent the first obvious challenges and bounds: 
1. SUC-Cloning Resistance: Basically, something can be 
cloned if it is known to somebody.  The Unclonability of a 
cipher comes from the fact that nobody knows it. The first 
obvious challenge that the cipher designer faces is how to 
create a cipher which the designer himself cannot predict? 
The first idea is to design a large cipher class from which 
one unknown cipher is selected. The size S of a cipher-class 
having n-bit as input-size is upper bounded by Smax=2n!. Smax 
is the number of all possible n-to-n bit permutations 
including trivial ciphers. Applying Stirling's approximation 
[14]:  
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As a result, cracking/cloning a 64-bit unknown cipher 
requires a search complexity of ( )( )
64 69.964 2 2 22 2O
− 
 . 
Whereas, cloning a standard 64-bit known cipher with 
unknown secret-key having 64 bits requires to guess just the 
key with a complexity of ( )642O . The security difference is 
obviously tremendous! A created SUC is considered as 
unknown or highly unpredictable/perfect if it is randomly 
selected from a class of size S approaching Smax.  
The Cloning Resistance Entropy (CRE) for a SUC can be 
defined as: 
SUC-Cloning-Resistance-Entropy CRE= log2 S 
If the creator GENIE is not published then CRE is at 
maximum:  
                          CREmax≈ log2 Smax ≈ (n-2) 2n  
If the GENIE is published which is the worst case:  
                                  CREmin= log2 Sg 
Where Sg is the class size of the cipher-class offered by the 
GENIE. The challenge on the cipher designer is to design Sg 
to be as large as possible with acceptable complexity. The 
two GENIE created sample cipher classes in this work have 
the cardinalities  501
132gS  and 
1234
2 2gS .  
2. SUC-Modeling Resistance: A cipher is considered as 
practically unclonable by modeling if it is not feasible to 
store all the challenge-response space as the Cipher 
Codebook size CCBS: 
0  2   = 
nCCBS  
Where 0  is the contemporarily valid infeasible 
cryptographic time and/or memory complexity level. 
80
0 2   is considered as adequate for traditional 
contemporary cryptography. 1600 2   is taken as adequate 
for post-quantum cryptography. For 80-bits ciphers n=80, 
that is CCBS=280. For low-cost practical consumer 
applications even n=64 may be acceptable.  
D. VLSI Hard-wired One-Way Functions 
The emerging VLSI technology was the driving motivation 
towards the SUC concept. Self-creating of irreversible, 
permanent and unknown mappings became first thinkable by 
the emerging modern non-volatile VLSI technology.  
The breakthrough concept of the public-key cryptography 
introduced in 1976 was based on claimed mathematical one-
way functions. All such claimed one-way functions, from 
which the public-key cryptography still lives are not provably 
one-way functions and a prove of one-way perfectness may 
never become possible in the future. Let us define similar 
functions in VLSI structures. 
Assume that the emerging VLSI technology would offer the 
capability of creating physically one-way hard-wired 
(permanent) functions in the sense that: they are hard (or even 
impossible) to reverse, change or remove. We postulate that this 
would become feasible within future VLSI structures through 
internal self-reconfiguration. Triggering a device-internal, 
single-event process without being able to predict/trace the 
created functions seems to become feasible. In that case; a one-
way physical unknown function is created. Assume that it is 
technologically infeasible/hard to reveal and change that 
created unknown physical digital entity, then an unclonable 
physical entity is created. As a result, the device incorporating 
that entity becomes unclonable.  
In difference to mathematical one-way functions, physical one-
way VLSI functions as “encapsulated-secrets” may practically 
be kept as secret and “unknown mappings” within the devices. 
Internal one-way-locks as irreversible-locks seem also to be 
practically realizable as in the case of anti-fuse VLSI 
technology. Recent technologies as memristors may emerge in 
3D constellations to new interesting permanent VLSI structures 
having smart one-way physical locking capabilities. 
A pragmatic-security and practically interesting property of 
such structures is that, attacking hardwired physical functions 
require physical invasive attacks which may practically-
frustrate attackers by being more expensive and occasionally 
impossible. Moreover, analytical and side channel attacks on 
unknown locked physical structures is much more complex 
especially if the physical layout locations of the structures are 
also not known. 
In Summary: Our key-concept assumes that future non-
volatile VLSI technologies would become smart-enough to 
allow self-creating/mutating of permanent unknown secrets or 
even operational and usable unknown cryptographic functions 
at unknown physical locations. We further assume that invasive 
physical attacks on such devices would become practically 
infeasible especially when creating hard-to-trace physical one-
way functions in 3D technologies. The resulting systems may 
be considered as practically-perfect if invasive attacks do not 
pay off. This is a very essential aspect for mass products as 
those in consumer and vehicular technology.  
A new paradigm like the mathematical one-way functions in 
public-key cryptography is mapped conceptually into the 
physical VLSI environment. Physical entities are expected to 
offer even much larger operational space than mathematical 
functions as physics is dealing with additional dimensions like 
space and time compared to the mathematical functions which 
are limited to abstract mappings. 
E. The Use of Unknown Ciphers and their Advantages 
Traditional PUFs as unknown weak hash mappings were used 
two decades ago [1][2][3] as born DNA-like chains to serve as 
unclonable identities with all their operational instability issues 
[15][16]. More details on PUFs are given in section III. PUFs 
may be seen somehow as a sort of born DNA-like analog weak 
unknown hash functions (non-linear functions).  
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There is, to the knowledge of the authors, no PUF-like natural 
born unknown cipher mappings in our physical environment. 
Artificially created SUCs, as one-to-one invertible mappings 
would offer much larger full-usability-space compared with the 
non-invertible PUFs mappings. A generic use-protocol to 
identify a physical unknown cipher module is described later in 
section IV.D. Refined SUCs use-protocols were shown to 
exhibit new applications and superior efficiency and 
manageability compared with the traditional PUFs as 
demonstrated in [17][8]. However, the most obvious and 
practical striking advantage of unknown ciphers compared with 
PUFs, is their “digital structure” exhibiting ultimate operational 
consistency over the whole lifetime of the digital VLSI device. 
In comparison, traditional analog PUFs are highly temperature, 
operation conditions and aging sensitive leading to very 
complex realization countermeasures to compensate for such 
drawbacks. There is a crying need for such consistent, clone-
resistant and low-cost physical modules in a large class of 
contemporary digital mass products. One very important 
property when deploying SUCs as post-fabrication entities, is 
that their security is manufacturer-independent as the whole 
security issues are shifted to the responsibility of the end-user 
or application manager. 
F. SUC Creation Challenges and Difficulties 
Manufacturers of non-volatile-FPGA like Microsemi stated that 
the most challenging self-reconfiguration requirement may 
become technically possible and available soon. However, 
more challenges would be facing the design and realization of 
SUCs in VLSI environment. The following challenges are 
identified: 
1. How to design a GENIE as cipher creating software package 
and/or cipher database of size S (S→2n!) with practical time 
and memory complexities to be executed just one time 
within the SoC unit. 
2. How to place/diffuse the selected cipher structure at possibly 
unknown locations in the FPGA-fabric to confuse attackers 
without violating the design rules of the VLSI structure. 
This seems to be the most challenging and possibly a very 
hard to solve task! 
3. How to make the fabric-and memory resources consumed 
by the SUC module practically as small as possible. 
The design challenges seem at the first sight to frustrate both 
cipher designers and FPGA programmers. In total, a highly 
challenging engineering and scientific task. 
This work is proposing two SUCs classes with moderate 
cloning quality (Sg =21350 or 21234) in a realistic environment. 
Units personalization should operate online at very high speed 
and relatively low production costs. The diffusion of the ciphers 
in the floorplan of the FPGA fabric is not perfect as ciphers 
locations are fixed to allow simple online SUC-creation while 
the bitstream is uploaded into the FPGA devices.   
The work represents one of the first attempts toward what we 
expect to become a VLSI-technology-oriented new paradigm in 
cryptography. 
III. TRADITIONAL PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS 
Since their advent in the early 2000s [1][2][3], Physical 
Unclonable Functions (PUFs) were increasingly proposed as 
central building blocks in security architectures. PUFs are 
proposed to be used for many applications such as devices 
identification and authentication [5][6], memoryless key 
storage [18] and intellectual property protection [19]. Most 
PUFs response spaces are noisy resulting with limited identity 
entropy. As a remedy to this problem, fuzzy extractors were 
proposed to stabilize the output response of each PUF [15][16]. 
Fuzzy extractors generate and store helper-data during the 
enrollment phase, which will be used for error correction in the 
reconstruction phase when the PUF response is noisy to 
reproduce the correct response by automatic error correction. 
Such error correction mechanisms are complex, costly and 
require a large number of logic gates, for instance Intrinsic ID’ 
Quiddikey plus requires 42 K Gates [20]. Compared to PUFs, 
SUCs do not require any error correction mechanism due to 
their digital structures. Moreover, SUCs result with lower 
hardware complexity and less latency. 
Many attacks on PUFs have been recently proposed. They 
are targeting both weak PUFs and strong PUFs; weak PUFs 
have few challenges, commonly only one challenge per PUF 
instance. Hence, it is assumed that access to the weak PUF 
response is restricted. However, semi-invasive means have 
been used to reveal the state of memory-based PUFs [21]. The 
second major PUFs types are Strong PUFs having large number 
of Challenge-Response Pairs (CRPs) and are assumed to be 
unpredictable. Hence, protecting the challenge-response 
interface is not necessary. Strong PUFs are less susceptible to 
cloning and invasive attacks as weak PUFs. However, modeling 
attacks represent a strong threat in cloning such PUFs. D. Lim 
introduced the first attack to model an Arbiter-Based PUF [18] 
and later on Majzoobi et al. analyzed linear and feed-forward 
PUF structures [22]. Recently, Rührmair et al. demonstrated 
PUF modeling attacks on many PUFs by using machine 
learning techniques [23]. In [24], side channel attack was used 
to analyze PUFs architecture and fuzzy extractor 
implementations by deploying power analysis. Recent attack 
trends combine both side channel and modeling attacks 
[25][26] to facilitate machine learning deployed for modeling 
attack. In [27], a hybrid attack is presented, combining side 
channel analysis and machine learning for attacking especially 
weak PUFs which prohibit attackers to observe their outputs. 
The same attack method can also be applied to strong PUFs. It 
was also shown that fuzzy extractors are also vulnerable to 
power analysis. This shows in general that traditional PUFs 
suffer from high-complexity and inherent inconsistency.  
IV. THE CONCEPT OF SECRET UNKNOWN CIPHERS AS DIGITAL 
PHYSICALLY CLONE-RESISTANT FUNCTIONS 
A. Early Work on Secret Unknown Ciphers 
In [28], a first attempt towards SUC realization was proposed 
as a secret and unknown random stream cipher deploying T-
functions as key stream generators with random S-Boxes.  In 
[29], a new family of stream ciphers was proposed to be used 
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as SUCs, the design is based on combining Nonlinear Feedback 
Shift Registers (NFSRs) with randomly selected feedback 
functions from a set of Boolean functions ensuring maximum 
period NFSRs. Both SUC designs are based on random stream 
ciphers. One of the objectives of this work is to create new 
efficient and large block cipher classes which can be easily 
embedded/mutated as SUCs in modern SoC FPGA devices.  
Such SUCs may serve as digital-PUFs at adequate cost and time 
complexities. SUCs based on random block ciphers can be 
efficiently deployed in a wide spectrum of smart vehicular 
security applications such as security-critical over the air 
software update [8]. SUC was also proposed as central building 
block for end-to-end device-to-device authentication in 5G 
network [9]. Another SUC-based solution for highly secure 
implantable medical devices was proposed in [10].    
B. Conceptual Definition of SUC 
Secret Unknown Cipher is a randomly internally self-
generated cipher inside a chip, where the user has no access or 
influence on its creation process. Even the device manufacturer 
should not be able to back-trace the creation process and deduce 
or predict the created random cipher. An individual unknown 
cipher is created in each unit after a non-repeatable single event 
non-reversible process. Each generated SUC is an invertible 
unknown Pseudo Random Function (PRF); defined as follows: 
 
   : 0,1 0,1
n m
SUC
X PRF Y
→
 
(2) 
and its inverse mapping as: 
 
   1
1
: 0,1 0,1
m n
SUC
Y PRF X
−
−
→
 
(3) 
A SUC when designed as a block cipher, requires that m n . 
For lowest implementation complexity, an Involutive-SUC (I-
SUC) is a good choice. In that case 1SUC SUC−= . For 
optimum space utilization m n= , (input and output spaces are 
equal) the cipher is then defined as a Pseudo Random 
Involution PRI: 
 
   : 0,1 0,1
n n
SUC
X PRI Y
→
 (4) 
where  ( ( ))SUC SUC X X=  for all  0,1
n
X  . That is, 
encryption and decryption operations use the same mappings 
resulting with minimized realization complexity.  
C. Basic SUC Creation Concepts and Use Scenario  
Fig. 2 describes a possible scenario for embedding SUC in a 
System on Chip (SoC) non-volatile FPGA devices. The 
personalization process proceeds as follows:  
• Step 1: A Trusted Authority (TA) uploads a software 
package called “GENIE” that contains an algorithm for 
creating internally secure random ciphers. Possibly, a 
Cipher Data Base CDB of cryptographically strong 
functions is included to support selecting the SUCs. The TA 
uploads the GENIE for a short time into each SoC FPGA 
unit to be used for just one time.  
• Step 2: After being loaded into the chip, the GENIE is 
triggered to create a permanent (non-volatile) and 
unpredictable random cipher. The cipher design 
components are completely randomly selected by deploying 
random bits from a True Random Number Generator 
(TRNG) within the chip. 
• Step 3: After completing the SUCu creation, the GENIE is 
completely deleted 
• Step 4: by completing step 3, the SoC FPGA unit u contains 
its unique and unpredictable SUCu. TA then 
personalizes/enrolls the unit u by challenging its SUCu with 
a plaintext challenge-set {Xu,0, Xu,1 … Xu,(t-1)} to gets the 
corresponding ciphertext response-set {Yu,0, Yu,1 … Yu,(t-1)}. 
The two sets are stored securely as secret records in the 
Units Individual Records (UIR) labeled by the Serial 
Number of the device SNu. UIRs are kept secret by TA. A 
secret key KTA may be added to the SUC design for multi 
TA usage. 
The X/Y pairs can be used later by TA to identify and 
authenticate devices.  
SNu
Xu,0 Yu,0
… …
Xu,i Yu,i
… …
Xu,t-1 Yu,t-1
SUCu
GENIE
Trusted Authority
Created Secret
Cipher known
only to the chip
1
2
Load a Smart  Cipher  
Creator “GENIE”  
(Software package)
3
TRNG
GENIE
TRNG
Xi
Yi
4
SoC FPGA 
SNu
SUCu
SN1
X1,0 Y1,0
… …
X1,i Y1,i
… …
X1,t-1 Y1,t-1
Secured “Units Individual Records” 
UIRs (to be kept secret!)
KTA
KTA
SNn
Xn,0 Yn,0
… …
Xn,i Yn,i
… …
Xn,t-1 Yn,t-1
 
Fig. 2. The basic concept for creating SUC in SoC FPGAs environment 
D. Generic Physical Identification Protocol for SUC Units 
After finalizing the personalization process (Step-4 in Fig. 2), 
TA has for each SoC FPGA a secret record in the UIR including 
X/Y pairs. In reference to Fig. 3, a two-way protocol may 
identify a physical unit u (SNu), having uSUC and 
1
uSUC
−  
structures as follows: 
• TA selects randomly one of the Xu,i/Yu,i pairs and challenges 
unit u with Yu,i . Unit u uses its 
1
uSUC
−  to decrypt Yu,i 
resulting with the corresponding cleartext  
' 1
, ,( )u i u u iX SUC Y
−=  and sends ' ,u iX  to TA.  
• If '
, ,u i u iX X=  then the unit is deemed to be authentic and 
can be accepted.  Otherwise u is not authentic and should be 
rejected. The pair Xu,i/Yu,i  is marked as consumed and should 
not be used later for highest security performance. 
The concept is comparable to a PUF with the advantage that 
SUC based design is capable to recover X from Y by using the 
inverse function SUC-1. This property was used in [8] to build 
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a physical chain of trust for a secured over the air vehicular 
software update.  
Trusted Authority
Yu,i X’u,i
Accept
X u,i = X’u,i
?
Notice: !! never use the pair  Xu,i,Yu,i again !!
SNu
Physical Unit u
Xu,i
KTA
Yu,i
One-time
ticket
1
2
yes
no
Reject
KTAKTA
SNu
Xu,0 Yu,0
… …
Xu,i Yu,i
… …
Xu,t-1 Yu,t-1
SN1
X1,0 Y1,0
… …
X1,i Y1,i
… …
X1,t-1 Y1,t-1
Secured “Units Individual Records” 
UIRs (to be kept secret!)
KTA
SNn
Xn,0 Yn,0
… …
Xn,i Yn,i
… …
Xn,t-1 Yn,t-1
SUCu
SUCu
-1
 
Fig. 3. Generic use protocol for a secret unknown cipher SUC 
E. Requirements for SUC-Creation 
The most difficult and challenging task in creating SUCs is 
how to devise and run a “GENIE” software with acceptable 
complexity in memory and time in the target SoC units. This is 
highly dependent on the existing technology infrastructure.  
The requirements for an ultimate creation environment can be 
summarized as follows:   
1. A non-volatile FPGA fabric with self-reconfiguration 
capability, to result with permanent hard-wired structures 
created by a non-repeatable single-event process by the 
GENIE program. Such technology is not yet available, but 
it is expected to be available soon in emerging smarter 
technologies. The nearest usable existing non-volatile 
technology is Microsemi SmartFusion®2 SoC FPGA 
devices. However, without a self-reconfiguration capability. 
2. The created SUC structures should become non-removable. 
That is, a secured one-way locking mechanism to prohibit 
later self-reconfiguration capability is necessary. 
3. Low GENIE runtime for cipher creation. 
4. Low software complexity and runtime in downloading and 
deleting the GENIE. 
5. The locations of the created SUC functions should be hard 
to find or to predict. 
6. The selected SUC functions, their parameters and their 
operation sequence and contents should be unpredictable 
and analytically hard to attack. 
7. The attained SUC security-level should be acceptable even 
when the “GENIE” is completely published, disclosed or 
somehow become known to the attackers. 
V. A NEW CONCEPT FOR SUCS CREATION IN FPGA DEVICES 
This section presents a novel technique for high-speed 
creation procedure of SUCs in SoC FPGAs. The creation 
concept is based on Bitstream-manipulation in a pre-defined 
FPGA layout template.  
A. New Key-Concept for Template-Based SUCs Creation 
The key idea of the creation concept and targets are 
illustrated in Fig. 4. According to Fig. 4 (a), the design compiler 
of the FPGA investigates the floorplan of the existing used 
application area and seeks free gaps of unused FPGA-cells. A 
designer may also reserve some free layout areas/blocks as free-
area to allocate the SUC structures there in a later incremental 
design compilation. The free areas (dashed area in Fig. 4 (a)) 
are then routed and interconnected as an SUC-design-template 
with default design-rules-safe contents. This SUC-design-
template is downloaded in the bitstream completely equally for 
all units to be personalized. A layout for the free templates is 
shown in Fig. 4 (a). In the personalization process, and when 
downloading the FPGA-bitstream into each individual unit as 
in Fig. 4 (b), a random selection of cipher mappings and their 
parameters is programmed/configured in the free 
software/hardware templates respectively to make each unit 
differently unique. The GENIE should create completely 
differently allocated, and occupied with unpredictable and 
unknown ciphers as shown in Fig. 4 (b), units 1 to n. 
Notice that the SUC-design-template contains mappings and 
functionalities which may be or may not be used in the final 
generated SUC inside each individual unit. The software 
mappings, constituting the SUC program, are distributed also 
randomly in blocks in the reserved non-volatile memory 
locations. The use and parameter selections of all reserved 
templates are completely randomly selected by the random bits 
generated by the TRNG module within the SoC unit. As the 
TRNG bits are completely unpredictable, the resulting ciphers 
SUC1 to SUCn are fully unknown, different and unpredictable 
in their locations, contents and parameters as symbolically 
indicated in Fig. 4 (b).  
Again, the SoC FPGA configuration bitstream is manipulated 
by the GENIE affecting only the dedicated SUC-design-
template locations according to the TRNG random source bits. 
Therefore, as shown for example in Fig. 4 (b), the unit of SUC1 
has less blocks and are differently occupied at different 
locations compared with the unit of SUCn.  
SoC FPGA Unit
FPGA Fabric
NV-Memory
Consumed Application Area
(Empty Template)
SoC FPGA Unit 1
FPGA Fabric
Unit  filled up with  SUC1
…
SoC FPGA Unit  n
FPGA Fabric
UC
Core
NV-MemoryNV-Memory
UC
Core
UC
Core
(a) (b)
Unit  filled up with SUCn
Consumed Application Area Consumed Application Area
Consumed Application
Program Area
Free programmable
memory space
 
Fig. 4. A Template-based concept for SUC generation in FPGA environment 
B. Technical Realization of a Template-Based SUC Creation  
Fig. 5 illustrates a possible internal personalization process. 
It is also describing a concept for partially self-reconfiguring 
SoC FPGAs. During the personalization process, the 
Manipulating GENIE modifies the corresponding bits of the 
cryptographic mappings by randomly selecting ciphering 
blocks from the Cipher Data Base (CDB). The blocks are filled 
up also directly by randomly selected contents from CDB. All 
random selections are controlled by the TRNG bit source to 
deliver unpredictable selections. In Fig. 5, the SoC FPGA 
> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) < 
 
7 
configuration bitstream BS is modified to BS’ to accommodate 
the default SUC-design-template into it. For FPGA 
personalization process, BS’ is usually encrypted to EBS’ for 
better production security in the user environment. Fig. 5 
illustrates the personalization process that proceeds as follows: 
1. The encrypted bitstream BS’ as EBS’ is downloaded equally 
to configure each SoC FPGA individually. EBS’ includes the 
application design together with the SUC-design-template.  
2. The decryption results with BS’ bitstream which is 
manipulated in real time by the GENIE controller fed and 
instructed by the random bits from TRNG. Based on these 
true random bits, the controller selects some mappings from 
the Cipher Data Base (CDB) and possibly selects random 
fill-ups mappings correspondingly. The control unit 
manipulates the configuration bitstream 'BS  to 'uBS  for unit 
u correspondingly. The result now is an individual, randomly 
personalized bitstream 'uBS  for the unit u. Notice that, even 
if all units are personalized at the same time in parallel, each 
unit would create a different unpredictable and unknown 
own SUC. The probability to get two equal SUCs, even when 
key-entropy is ignored, is 1/S. The attained  
SUC-cardinalities in the two proposed SUCs are Sg = 21350 
or Sg= 21234 (see section VI and 0) resulting with probability 
of equal SUCs approaching zero. 
3. 'uBS  is now stored in both the non-volatile software part and 
in the FPGA-fabric to permanently-program the device 
individually. This process represents a single-event 
“electronic mutation” within each SoC-FPGA device. 
After completing the personalization of uSUC , the 
Manipulating GENIE is deleted and a “possible” 
reconfiguration-lock is irreversibly activated to prohibit any 
later changes on the FPGA-fabric or the NV-software. The unit 
would include at this stage a permanent and operational Secret 
Unknown Cipher uSUC  which nobody knows. This makes an 
individual FPGA device physically unique with a probability 
approaching 100%. The only entity which can encrypt and 
decrypt according to the unknown cipher uSUC  is that 
individual unit without any possible substitute. Even the trusted 
authority TA do not know the cipher and cannot fabricate any 
physically equal unit. Notice also that, the locations of the used 
templates are not known. An invasive complicated attack is 
required to read the manipulated bitstream to be able to clone 
the unit. Each unit needs to be attacked individually, as cloning 
one unit would not make cloning another unit less complex. 
EBS’: Encrypted  BS’
• AC: Application Core
• CDB: Cipher Data Base
• TRNG: True Random Number Generator
• SUC: Secret Unknown Cipher
ControllerTRNG
Unitu
switch
FPGA Fabric
Application Core
HW-SUCuj
HW-SUCu1 HW-SUCuM
eNVM
SW-SUCu
CDB
1011... 011 011011... 01...
Manipulating GENIE
BS: Bitstream for only application core 
Decryption
'
u
BS
BS’: Bitstream including SUC-design-template
BS’
: Bitstream after SUCu manipulation
SUCu=SW-SUCu| HW-SUCu1|…|HW-SUCuM
SUC Free Space Templates
2 '
u
BS
SoC FPGA
3
1
3
33
 
Fig. 5. SoC FPGA personalization/enrollment “mutation” process 
C. Necessary FPGA Infrastructure for SUC Realization 
The Configuration bitstream contains all information about all 
Look Up Tables (LUT) contents, Block SRAMs, MACCs, I/O 
pins configuration and the exact placement and routing of all 
the used components in the design. Many modern FPGA 
technologies encrypt the bitstream to protect designer IPs. A 
decryption engine in the FPGA device reveals the configuration 
bitstream internally before configuring the device. In our target 
NV-Microsemi FPGA technology, even a legal user is not 
allowed to get access to the clear configuration bitstream. The 
user has even no information about the bitstream format to 
allow locating the bits to be manipulated in the SUC-design-
templates. Therefore, a modified bitstream management in such 
FPGAs is necessary to allow the realization of the presented 
SUC creation concept. The modified bitstream management 
should allow bitstream manipulation and allow knowing the 
locations of the corresponding footprints of the template in the 
bitstream format. Some FPGA technologies allow locating 
LUTs contents in the configuration bitstream. It may also be 
possible to allocate the configuration bits of the interconnection 
fabrics inside the FPGA. 
Fig. 6 shows a sample 4-to-4-bit S-Box. Each output bit iy  
represents a logical function iF  of the inputs 3 2 1 0x x x x . Every 4-
bit LUT can implement any 4 to 1 logical function. The function 
Fi is realized in iLUT  through a block of 16-bit in the bitstream 
describing the truth table of the 4 to 1 logical function. The 4 
LUTs required to implement the 4-to-4-bit S-Box are  
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Fig. 6. Sample representation of a 4-bit S-Box in the configuration bitstream 
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represented by 4 blocks of 16-bits as in the example of Fig. 6. 
That is, the total configuration bits (bitstream bits) required to 
implement such 4-bit S-Box is 64 bits. 
D. Inspiring SUC Structures from FPGA Resources 
To attain the highest resource utilization the mapping boxes 
deployed for a cipher should have the same input-size as the 
LUTs. Consequently, the existing FPGA elements in their most 
efficient operation and interconnection mode should define and 
dictate the structure of the mapping operations to be used in the 
created SUCs. Possible strategies and rules for ultimate creation 
of SUCs in future programmable VLSI technologies can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Recycle the existing unused free resources in a modern 
FPGA application device to come up with minimum and 
possibly zero-cost SUC design. 
2. Let the existing free logical resources define and dictate the 
basic cipher mapping functions to be used in designing the 
GENIE cipher classes. 
3. Design new crypto-mappings to optimally use such ready 
and free existing FPGA functions. 
4. The implementation complexity is seen to be zero if the 
unused free FPGA resources are consumed in the created 
SUC structure.  
5. SUCs are accessed rarely in many applications. In such 
cases, a trade-off between execution time and consumed 
hardware resources may optimize the whole system 
performance. The smaller the hardware structure is, the 
easier is hiding and managing it within the FPGA fabric. 
6. Investigate completely new non-conventional ciphering 
structures based on the free unused FPGA mapping 
resources. This may result with novel cipher-classes which 
are otherwise not considered by standard cipher designers 
due to their unacceptable high-complexity. 
E. Design-Flow for Creating SUCs in Microsemi SoC FPGAs 
To check the feasibility of the proposed SUC creation 
concept, a sample real FPGA environment is selected as a 
possible future target technology. SUC concept requires non-
volatile FPGA devices to make sure that the created SUCs as 
units’ identities are permanent and not removable. Modern SoC 
FPGAs incorporate an FPGA fabric together with at least a 
microcontroller core. Microsemi FPGA technology is to our 
knowledge, the only contemporary non-volatile FPGA 
technology having the non-volatile configuration memory cells 
distributed over the whole NV-FPGA fabric area. This makes 
an invasive attack more difficult if the bitstream is not readable 
as the whole fabric area need to be attacked. In contrary to that, 
volatile RAM-based FPGAs, can be attacked when reloading 
the bitstream in the start-up after every power-off case. That is, 
the attack can focus on the flash memory accommodating the 
bitstream and possibly its usually deployed encryption 
mechanism. Non-volatile technology does not require to reload 
bitstreams after power-off offering much higher physical 
security level. Repeated transfer of secrets is a serious security 
threat in all practical systems. Volatile FPGAs can only be 
securely used to accommodate SUC modules if the operational 
lifetime of the unit’s identity is just the time between a single 
switch-on and off phase. This represents a dramatic limitation 
for most physical security applications. 
Fig. 7 describes a possible design flow and device 
personalization/enrollment process for creating SUCs in SoC 
FPGAs. The sketched concept is dedicated for Microsemi SoC 
FPGAs architecture and may be applicable on similar FPGA 
technologies. The process may proceed as follows:  
1. The SUC design template structure is added to the dedicated 
device Application Core (AC) that should be compiled and 
locked against layout changes in an early stage.  
2. If no SUC creation is necessary, Libero SoC creates a pure 
application bitstream EBS corresponding to device AC. 
3. To generate a bitstream including the SUC-design-template, 
Libero SoC can perform an incremental synthesis and 
routing for the free SUC-design-templates. The updated 
Encrypted Bitstream (EBS’) contains the application core 
together with the SUC-design-template.  
4. When loading EBS’ into the device, a decryption engine 
residing inside the FPGA decrypts EBS’ to result with a clear 
bitstream BS’.  
5. The Manipulator GENIE residing in each SoC modifies the 
bitstream BS’ on-the-fly during its loading by filling up the 
free templates by the randomly chosen SUC mappings in 
every particular device. The manipulator GENIE delivers 
then the personalized bitstream, for instance BS1’ for unit 1.  
6. After personalization, the Manipulator GENIE is deleted. 
Each SoC unit includes its own mutated SUC identity. 
Steps 4 to 6 are repeated for each unit individually. 
Device Application 
Core (AC)
SUC HW (HDL)
SUC SW (Soft.)
SUC design 
Constraints
Updated Bitstream: (EBS’)
BS1’ Manipulator
BS2’
BSt’’
Personalizing SoC unit by creating 
individual SUC in each Unit
EBS’ includes 
SUC Template
Application Core 
Bitstream (EBS)
Without SUC 
module
SUC1
Libero SoC
Libero SoC
…
SoC1
SoC2
SoCt
“Manipulation GENIE as in Fig. 5”
SUC2
SUCt
…
1 2
3
Incremental synthesis and routing
generates updated encrypted Bitstream EBS’
including SUC templates
D
ec
ry
p
ti
o
n
BS’
4
56
SUC
Design template
Model
 
Fig. 7. Possible process flow for creating SUCs in Microsemi-similar SoC 
FPGA environment 
Fig. 8 describes in details a possible schedule to compile the 
new bitstream EBS’ including the free SUC bitstream-templates 
embedded in the device application core. The process can 
proceed as follows (Fig. 8): 
1. The user application core is locked after compilation. Its 
layout can also be locked to avoid any influence on the 
original application tasks and performance.  
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2. The SUC design template is added in HDL to the locked 
Application Core.  
3. The FPGA design-compiler routes incrementally the 
designed SUC- Templates.  
4.  A new encrypted bitstream EBS’ including the application 
core together with the free SUC templates is created.  
The same EBS’ should be generated in encrypted form for each 
device to be programmed/enrolled.  
Necessary FPGA Changes: Notice that the Microsemi-FPGA 
bitstream management requires to be modified to allow 
embedding the bitstream manipulator GENIE shown in Fig. 5 
and deleting it after use. In addition to that, the design compiler 
should allow the cipher-designer to know the locations of the 
bits corresponding to the created free templates.  
Application Core (AC)  (in HDL)
Normally generates bitstream:  BS
Compile_point: Locked
GENIE Created
SUC (HDL) Cipher Design  
EBS’: Bitstream Generation
AC + SUC-Template (EBS’)
1
2
3
4
Incremental compilation ad 
routing
 
Fig. 8. Bitstream incremental update for embedding the SUC-design-templates 
The SUC-templates are generated according to the GENIE- 
created cipher class. Two sample SUC cipher-classes are 
proposed in the following sections. 
VI. A NON-INVOLUTIVE SUC STRUCTURE PROPOSAL  
For efficient performance, SUC should consume low 
software and hardware FPGA resources to be implemented 
possibly at zero cost in the free available FPGA resources. This 
section describes a first proposed SUC class coined as a Non-
Involutive SUC (NI-SUC). 
A. A New Concept for Non-Involutive SUC Design Structure 
The proposed non-Involutive SUC (NI-SUC) is a random 
cipher based on Substitution Permutation Network (SPN) 
structure designed to optimally use the FPGA resources. Fig. 9 
describes the overall NI-SUC cipher structure having a block 
size of 64 bits. The cipher includes R=31 rounds where 1+R  
keys are generated by a key scheduling algorithm. For each 
round, a round key Ki is XORed before the substitution layer 
and after the last round.  
The substitution layer includes 16 randomly 4-to-4-bit 
mappings selected from the list of all optimal 4-bit S-Boxes. 
Optimal 4-bit S-Boxes were designed and investigated in [30] 
to be optimal against differential, linear and algebraic attacks. 
The diffusion stage is implemented as fixed bit permutation.  
 
bit permutation
15S 14S 13S 12S 11S 10S 9S 8S 7S 6S 5S 4S 3S 2S 1S 0S
15S 14S 13S 12S 11S 10S 9S 8S 7S 6S 5S 4S 3S 2S 1S 0S
1K
0K
bit permutation
bit permutation
15S 14S 13S 12S 11S 10S 9S 8S 7S 6S 5S 4S 3S 2S 1S 0S
rK
1rK −
bit permutation
 
Fig. 9. NI-SUC cipher structure 
B. Optimal 4-bit S-Boxes for the Creation GENIE Library 
Let 4 42 2:S →  be a 4-bit S-Box S. Let ( )Lin S  and ( )Diff S
denote the linearity and the differential resistance of S 
respectively. An optimal 4-bit S-Box fulfills the following 
conditions [30][31]:   
1. S is a bijection  
2. ( ) 8Lin S =  
3. ( ) 4Diff S =   
In [30], the affine equivalence classes of bijective 4-bit S-Boxes 
have been exhaustively analyzed. There exist 20.41 032 2396 
such optimal 4-bit S-Boxes ordered in 16 classes.  
The proposed substitution layer of NI-SUC contains 16 
randomly selected optimal 4-bit S-Boxes out of the set of all 
20.41 032 2396  optimal 4-bit S-Boxes.  
C. Non-Involutive SUC Bit Permutation Mapping 
To attain adequate hardware efficiency, we propose to use a 
bit permutation stage which deploys only the interconnections 
fabric for the diffusion layer. A new fixed bit-permutation is 
devised and investigated to be deployed in the NI-SUC design.  
 
TABLE I 
NI-SUC BIT-PERMUTATION  
i 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
p(i) 0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 
i 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
p(i) 32 36 40 44 48 52 56 60 
i 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
p(i) 1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 
i 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
p(i) 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 
i 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
p(i) 2 6 10 14 18 22 26 30 
i 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 
p(i) 34 38 42 46 50 54 58 62 
i 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 
p(i) 3 7 11 15 19 23 27 31 
i 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 
p(i) 35 39 43 47 51 55 59 63 
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TABLE I describes the permutation table. The bit position i of 
round r  is mapped to bit position ( )p i  of the next round 1r +
. This bit permutation has the property that the outputs of any 
S-Box in round r are connected to the inputs of 4 different S-
Boxes in round 1r + .   
D. Proposed Key Scheduling Algorithm  
The LUTs in a non-volatile technology can be deployed to 
efficiently store keys. Fig. 10 shows a novel Random Key 
Scheduling Algorithm for NI-SUC (
NIRKSA ), to accommodate 
32 fully random keys of length 64 bits in 64 LUTs. It is based 
on using random 4 to 1 mappings :j
i
j
ik
F C k→ , where C is the 
4 bits LSB or the 4 bits MSB of the rounds counter and jik  
denotes the subkey bit j of round key i. All the mappings j
ik
F  
are 4-to-1 LUTs. Hence one LUT stores 16 key bits. The key 
scheduling requires 64 LUTs for all random mappings j
ik
F .  
To realize NIRKSA , the GENIE manipulates randomly the 
configuration bitstream for the 64 LUTs by direct use of the 
random bits generated by the TRNG. The whole created key is 
then fully unpredictable and unknown. The up-down counter is 
used to allow both encryption and decryption operations. 
NIRKSA  generates the encryption round-keys by counting-up 
and the decryption round-keys by counting-down.  
As each LUT is a 4 to 1 mapping having =
42 162 2  
possibilities. Hence the cardinality (key space) of NIRKSA  is: 
 
42 64 10242 2
1024
 =
− =
NIRKSA
Or the key Entropy Bits
 (5) 
 
i
k
TRNGManipulator GENIE
4 bits 4 bits
5-bit Up-Down Counter
64 bits
63
ik
F 32
ik
F 31
ik
F 0
ik
F
 
Fig. 10. Random key scheduling algorithm for NI-SUC (
NIRKSA ) 
E. The Cardinality of NI-SUC Cipher Class 
NI-SUCs deploy 16 randomly selected 4-bits S-Boxes from 
the set of all optimal 4-bits S-Boxes and a fixed bit permutation. 
Each resulting SUC depends on the randomly selected S-Boxes 
and the bits of the key scheduling algorithm. 
For NI-SUC, with a block size of N-bits and number of different 
substitution layers |SL|, using 4-bit optimal S-Boxes, the cipher 
class cardinality with r-different rounds is: 
2
log (#Optimal 4-bit S-Boxes)
4- 2
N
SL
NI SUC
 
=  (6) 
For a block size of 64N bits= and one distinct round |SL|=1, 
the number of all creatable ciphers (cipher-class cardinality) is: 
20.4
2
64
log (2 )
3264- 2 2NI SUC

=          
As the key space is 
10242NIRKSA . That is 
10242  different 
key choices are possible for each NI-SUC S-Boxes set 
selections. Therefore, the total number of possible creatable 
SUCs with secret unknown keys is: 
1024 326 1350
1 2 2
NI
g RKSA
S NI SUC += −    
A single unknown choice out of this huge number of ciphers 
can be considered as a practically unknown cipher with a 
cloning resistance entropy of 1350 bits. It is upper bounded by 
≈ 20.4 x 31 x 16 + 1024 = 11 142 bits for 31 rounds. 
VII. INVOLUTIVE SUC CREATION CONCEPT  
A. Involutive SUC Structure 
This section describes an involutive SUC coined as I-SUC. 
The ciphers structure is also inspired from the existing FPGA 
fabric resources. The cipher is also an SPN design structure 
with 32-rounds (R=32).  
Fig. 11 describes the proposed I-SUC block structure. I-SUC 
uses in difference to the former cipher class 16 randomly 
selected however, only Involutive 4-bit S-Boxes (IS0 to IS15).  
Moreover, I-SUC deploys a fixed involutive diffusion layer. 
Notice that the final round includes only a substitution layer. 
15IS 14IS 13IS 12IS 11IS 10IS 9IS 8IS 7IS 6IS 4IS 3IS 2IS 1IS 0IS
Plaintext/Ciphertext 
Involutive Diffusion Layer (Permutation P) 
15IS 14IS 13IS 12IS 11IS 10IS 9IS 8IS 7IS 6IS 5IS 4IS 3IS 2IS 1IS 0IS
15IS 14IS 13IS 12IS 11IS 10IS 9IS 8IS 7IS 6IS 5IS 4IS 3IS 2IS 1IS 0IS
Ciphertext/ Plaintext 
5IS
0K
Involutive Diffusion Layer (Permutation P)
iK
2RK −
 
Fig. 11. I-SUC using micro involutive S-Boxes 
B. A Library for Involutive S-Boxes  
In [31], all the 4-bit involutive (self-inverse) S-boxes with 
linear, differential and almost resilient analysis were 
investigated. According to [31], the number of such optimal 
involutive 4-bit S-Boxes is found to be 
17.151 20 245 9    
C. Involutive Diffusion Layer  
To use the same structure for both encryption and decryption 
operations, the diffusion layer should also be an involution. An 
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involutive linear transformation from [32] is modified for the 
proposed cipher as shown in Fig. 12 and described formally in 
equations (7) and (8). It is selected and adapted to optimally 
make use of the hosting FPGA resources. 
The linear transformation is only involutive for even number of 
S-Boxes. Let 
out
iS  be the 4-bit output of the 
thi  S-Box, the XOR 
sum of the outputs of all 16 involutive S-Boxes is: 
 
15
0
out
i
i
Sum S
=
=  (7) 
Each 4-bits output (Outi) of the permutation is defined as: 
 
out
i iOut S Sum=   (8) 
 
The overall involutive diffusion layer P is defined as: 
15 14 0 15 14 0( || || ... || ) || || ... ||= =
out out outP X S S S Out Out Out  
Where || denotes the concatenation operation. 
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Fig. 12. I-SUC round having involutive substitution and diffusion stages with 
an XORed round key 
D. Conditions on I-SUC to Yield an Involutive Cipher 
For R rounds I-SUC, let SLi with 0 1  −i R  be a random 
involutive Substitution Layer i, and the fixed diffusion layer P. 
Let X be the input plaintext and Y be the output ciphertext, then:  
( )( )( )( )( )( )2 01 2 0
- ( )
...−− −
=
=  RR R
Y I SUC X
SL K P SL K P SL X
 
(9) 
For an I-SUC to be involutive, the decryption function should 
be the same as the encryption function however with reversed 
key order, that is:  
( )( )( )( )( )( )0 21 2 0
- ( )
... −− −
=
=  RR R
X I SUC Y
SL K P SL K P SL X
 
(10) 
If P and key XORing operations commute, such that  
( ) ( )r rP X K P X K =    in any round r (see the necessary 
conditions in the theorem and key deriving equation (14) 
below) then :  
( )( )( )( )( )( )0 21 2 0... −− −=  RR RX SL P K SL P K SL Y  (11) 
In that case the same hardware mappings can be used for 
encryption and decryption by just reversing the key order. 
To fulfill (11), and let I-SUC be involutive, the substitution 
layers need to fulfill the following conditions: 
 
1
0 : 1 ; for  even
2
with
1
0 : 1 ; for  odd
2
R i i
R
R
SL SL i
R
R
− −
 
− 
 
= 
−  −  
  (12) 
Designing I-SUC according to (12) results with a large class of 
I-SUCs since a new set of the involutive S-Boxes can be 
randomly selected in about 50% of the cipher rounds. However, 
this would result with high hardware complexity. Hence, we 
propose to use the same random substitution layer 0SL  equally 
in all rounds.  
To fulfill the required Commutative Property between P and 
the XORed Key, the following theorem followed by deriving 
design requirements.  
Theorem. Let P denotes the diffusion layer of I-SUC, and let 
the key of round r be 15 14 0|| || ... ||
r r r rK K K K= .  
If 15 14 1 0... 0
r r r rK K K K    = , then: 
 
( ) ( )r rP X K P X K =   (13) 
Proof. Let 15 14 0|| || ... ||
r r r rO O O O=  be the output result of the 
diffusion layer output XORed with the round key rK , such as: 
15 14 0( || || ... || )
out out out r rP X S S S K O=  =  
According to (7) and (8), we have: 
15
0 1 15
0
...
( )
out out out out
i
i
r r out r
i i i i i
Sum S S S S
O Out K Sum S K
=
= =   
=  =  

 
To compute '( )r rP X K O = , first we have: 
15
0 15 15 0
0
'
' ( ) ( ... ) ( ... )
' ( )
=
=  =     
=  

out out out r r
i i
i
r out r
i i i
Sum S K S S K K
O Sum S K
 
For 'r ri iO O= , the following condition should hold: 
 
15 0' ... 0
r rSum Sum K K=    =  
Key requirements to fulfill (13): This condition can be 
fulfilled by taking any 4-bit key symbol equal to the XORed 
sum of the remaining key symbols, for instance:  
 
15 1 0...
r r rK K K  =  (14)  
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E. Key Scheduling Algorithm for I-SUC 
Fig.  13 describes the Random Key Scheduling Algorithm for 
I-SUC design (
IRKSA ) for R=32 rounds with 31 keys. In each 
round r, a round key 15 14 0|| || ... ||
r r r rK K K K=  is generated 
according to (14) such that 15 1 0...
r r rK K K  = . In this sample 
design, 60 LUTs are filled-up as unknown secret key randomly 
by the GENIE while 20 LUTs implement the XORing 
operations to generate 0
rK . In this case, the key cardinality is: 
 
42 60 9602 2IRKSA
 =  (15) 
4 LUTs 4 LUTs 4 LUTs 4 LUTs
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Fig.  13. Key scheduling algorithm for I-SUC 
F. Total Cardinality of the Created I-SUC Classes  
I-SUC deploys 16 random S-Boxes selected from the class of 
optimal 4-bit involutive S-Boxes, and a fixed linear diffusion 
layer. For I-SUC, with a block size N, using optimal 4-bit 
involutive S-Boxes, the cipher-class cardinality due to the 
number of possible S-Boxes choices for |SL| different rounds 
is: 
2
log (#Optimal inv. 4-bit S-Boxes)
2 4- 2
SL N
I SUC
 
=  
(16) 
For I-SUC with a block size N=64 bits, |SL|=1, the class-size is: 
2log (145920) 2744- 2 2
N
I SUC

=   
Notice that the key space is 
9602IRKSA . That is 
9602  
different key choices do exist for each I-SUC S-Boxes choice. 
Hence, the total number of possible I-SUCs with keys is: 
960 274 1234
2 2 2
I
g RKSA
S NI SUC += −    
I-SUC is a practical low-cost SUC version with a cloning-
resistance-entropy of 1234 bits. It is upper bounded by ≈ 17.15 
x (32/2) x 16 + 960 = 5 350 bit for 32 different rounds. 
VIII. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SUC CLASSES 
The proposed cipher classes are ciphers with unknown S-
Boxes and keys. Therefore, first the traditional known attacks 
on ciphers with similar structures are presented.  
At Eurocrypt 2001, Biryukov and Shamir investigated the 
security of AES-like ciphers with key dependent S-Boxes and 
affine transformation, they successfully cryptanalyzed two and 
half rounds [33]. The attack was improved in [34] to 
successfully cryptanalyze Substitution Affine Networks 
(SANs) of three rounds with unknown or key dependent m-bit 
S-boxes and n n  bits affine layers with complexities 22 m  
chosen plaintexts and 32 ( / )m n m  time steps.  
In [35], Borghoff et al. proposed several attacks on C2 
algorithm, which has a secret 8 to 8 bits S-Box and a 56 bits 
key. The attack reverses firstly the S-Box with complexity of 
242  C2 encryptions and then the key with a complexity of 248. 
In [36], Borghoff et al. deployed similar manners with 
differential-style attack to break Maya with a number of rounds 
up to 28. Maya [37] is a PRESENT-like cipher with key 
dependent S-Boxes. The attack model described in [36] 
suggests that it is possible to break up to 28 rounds before 
reaching the bound 264 of possible plaintexts. The attack was 
extended to break PRESENT-like ciphers with secret 
components (S-Boxes or bit permutation), and randomly 
chosen components up to 16 rounds with data complexity less 
than 264. This type of differential-style attack exploits the weak 
differential properties of key dependent S-Boxes or randomly 
selected S-Boxes. We propose to deploy only a set of optimal 
S-Boxes characterized by strong differential and linear 
properties to prohibit the differential-style attack of [36] for 
both NI-SUC or I-SUC. 
To cryptanalyze NI-SUC, an adversary should reverse the 
randomly selected optimal S-Boxes and apply a known attack 
such as differential/linear cryptanalysis to break one NI-SUC. 
In the following, for both linear and differential cryptanalysis, 
only the second part of the attack on NI-SUC and I-SUC are 
investigated.  
A. Linear Cryptanalysis 
This section presents the security analysis of the proposed 
random block ciphers against linear cryptanalysis [38].  
Lemma 1. For NI-SUC, by deploying the bit permutation in 
Table I, the number of S-Boxes involved in any 2-Rounds of a 
linear approximation is greater than or equal to 4.  
Lemma 2. For I-SUC, by deploying the involutive diffusion 
layer of Fig. 12, the number of involutive S-Boxes involved in 
any 2-Rounds of a linear approximation is greater than or equal 
to 2.  
The maximal bias of a linear approximation of an optimal n-bit 
S-Box (n=4) is:       
1
22 2
2
n
n
NL
P
−
−−= =  
Where the nonlinearity of optimal 4-bit S-Boxes is NL=4. 
The number of Plaintext/Ciphertext pairs NL required for a 
linear cryptanalysis of an R rounds NI-SUC or I-SUC is: 
 
4
2
1
2 RL RN P
 =  (17) 
For NI-SUC or I-SUC having over 30 rounds, NL is greater than 
or at least 2120, which fulfills the contemporary security level 
requirement. 
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B. Differential Cryptanalysis 
Differential cryptanalysis was firstly introduced by Biham 
and Shamir in [39]. It has been used to break many ciphers such 
as the full 16 round DES-like cipher [40]. It exploits the high 
probability of certain occurrences of plaintext differences and 
differences into the last round of the cipher. 
Lemma 3. For the NI-SUC, by deploying the bit permutation in 
Table I, the number of S-Boxes involved in any 2-Rounds of a 
differential characteristic is greater than or equal to 4. 
Proof. Optimal 4-bit S-Boxes have the characteristic that, 
changing a single input bit would change at least two output 
bits. The proposed bit-permutation in Table I interconnects such 
that the input bits of any S-Box come from 4 distinct S-Boxes 
or equivalently any 4 output bits of an S-Box go to 4 distinct S-
Boxes.  
Lemma 4. For the I-SUC, after mapping through the involutive 
diffusion layer in Fig. 12, the number of involutive S-Boxes 
involved in any 2-Rounds of a differential characteristic is 
greater than or equal to 4.  
The maximum XOR pair probability of the S-Boxes used in the 
NI-SUC or I-SUC is equal to 2-2. Hence, the number of 
plaintext/ciphertext pairs required for differential cryptanalysis 
of an R rounds NI-SUC or I-SUC can be approximated by:  
 
R
DN
42  (18) 
For NI-SUC or I-SUC having at least 30 rounds, the number of 
Plaintext/Ciphertext pairs required for differential cryptanalysis 
is greater than or equal to 2120.  
C. Post-Quantum Cryptanalysis 
In 1994, Shor developed new quantum polynomial-time 
algorithms for the discrete logarithm and integer factoring 
problems [41]. Shor’s algorithm can be used, by an adversary 
armed with a quantum computer, to break the widely used RSA 
cryptosystem, DSA and ECDSA. However, there are many 
classes of cryptography that are beyond RSA, DSA and 
ECDSA that are not vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm such as 
[42]: Hash-based cryptography, Code-based cryptography, 
Lattice-based cryptography, Multivariate-quadratic-equations 
cryptography and Secret-key cryptography. In [43], Grover 
proposed a quantum algorithm that can find an element in a set 
of N completely randomly ordered elements with a complexity 
( )O N . Grover’s algorithm is the only known quantum 
algorithm threatening symmetric cryptography [44]. It is not 
shockingly fast as Shor’s algorithm, for instance, AES-
128/AES256 provide a post-quantum security level of 64-
bit/128-bit. For I-SUC and NI-SUC, the effective attack-
complexity is 2274 and 2326 respectively (without considering the 
cardinality of the key scheduling for NI-SUC). That is, the 
attack complexity of Grover’s algorithm is ( )1372O  for I-SUC 
and ( )1632O  for NI-SUC. 
D. Statistical Analysis of I-SUC and NI-SUC Classes 
This section shows some statistical cipher-performance figures 
for both proposed designs: I-SUC and NI-SUC. 
1) Simulated Avalanche Behavior of I-SUC and NI-SUC 
Few experimental simulations were conducted to investigate 
the effect of the number of rounds on the avalanche 
characteristics of both I-SUC and NI-SUC designs. 
One thousand randomly generated inputs were used to measure 
the avalanche characteristics for both SUCs as a function of the 
number of rounds. Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 show the experimental 
results for the number of output bit changes as a function of the 
number of rounds for both I-SUC and NI-SUC respectively. The 
results show that I-SUC reaches a perfect avalanche 
characteristic after only 3 rounds, while NI-SUC requires 7 
rounds. This is due to the linear transformation which 
significantly improves the avalanche characteristic of I-SUC. 
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Fig. 14. Output hamming distance as a function of number of rounds in I-SUC 
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Fig. 15. Output hamming distance as a function of number of rounds in NI-SUC 
2) Evaluating the Avalanche Properties of the Cipher Classes 
SUC is considered to have a good avalanche characteristic if 
flipping one input bit results with changing about half of the 
output bits. Since there are large number of possible ciphers for 
both proposed I-SUC and NI-SUC designs, we evaluate the 
avalanche characteristics for sets of randomly selected SUCs as 
follows: 
• One thousand optimal 4-bit S-Boxes are selected to 
generate thousand NI-SUCs  
• One thousand involutive optimal 4-bit S-Boxes are 
selected to generate thousand I-SUCs 
To evaluate the avalanche characteristics for each resulting 
SUC, 100 random messages are used, where each time one bit 
of the message is flipped. 
Fig.  16 and Fig.  17 show the ranges of the measured number 
of output bit changes when changing one input bit for thousand 
I-SUCs and NI-SUCs respectively. The SUCs are labeled as S0, 
S1, …, S999. Fig.  16 shows that for all randomly selected I-
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SUCs, the expected number of output bit changes is bounded 
between 28 and 35. Whereas, it is bounded by 22 and 31 for NI-
SUC in Fig.  17. 
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Fig.  16. Avalanche characteristic of one thousand I-SUC units 
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Fig.  17. Avalanche characteristic of one thousand NI-SUC units 
IX. PERFORMANCE AND COMPLEXITIES 
A. Hardware Complexity of the Created SUCs 
Hardware complexity was one of the main objectives of this 
work. NI-SUC uses a bit permutation mapping that does not 
consume logic resources (and no additional area in our 
example). However, only the encryption operation is 
prototyped and when needed (such as for identification protocol 
in Fig. 3), the decryption algorithm should be additionally 
implemented. The decryption module requires about 64-LUT 
less than the encryption one because both encryption and 
decryption designs use the same key scheduling. I-SUC is an 
involution and hence both encryption and decryption operations 
can be performed by using the same structures. When designing 
the proposed SUCs, the highest resource efficiency was targeted 
to optimally exploit the provided resources in Microsemi 
FPGAs. The proposed random SUCs are lightweight and could 
be used as physical identities adding a security value (possibly 
for free) in existing SoC FPGA applications. Fig.  18 shows an 
area optimized implementation method for the proposed NI-
SUC. I-SUC can be implemented similarly by using the 64-bit 
register after the substitution layer since the last round does not 
include a diffusion stage. 
S15 S14 S13 S12 S3 S2 S1 S0
Key 
update
64 bits
D
Q
Plaintext
enc/dec
64 bits
Bit permutation
Ciphertext
1   0
Ki
64-bit 
register
 
Fig.  18. Area optimized implementation for NI-SUC 
Table II shows the prototyped hardware complexities of the 
proposed SUC modules in SmartFusion®2 SoC FPGAs. It 
shows that the I-SUC version is a more efficient design (as 
involutive cipher) requiring much less resources for both 
encryption and decryption compared with the NI-SUC version. 
 
B. Complexity of a Pure Software SUC 
The implementation of NI-SUC and I-SUC in pure software 
form is prototyped on the ARM Cortex-M3 core embedded in 
SmartFusion®2 SoC FPGA. Table III describes the overhead 
of the software complexities for both I-SUC and NI-SUC. 
Note that M2S010/25/50/60 embed 64 Kbytes of eSRAM and 
256 Kbytes of eNVM. Whereas M2S090 and M2S150 embed 
64 Kbytes of eSRAM and 512 Kbytes of eNVM. 
 
X. SOFTWARE HARDWARE AND TIME COMPLEXITIES               
OF THE GENIE 
The most challenging task when dealing with the SUC 
concept is in designing an efficient GENIE program. The 
runtime complexity is one of the most challenging tasks for 
industrial applications. The necessary memory for the GENIE’s 
TABLE II 
HARDWARE COMPLEXITIES OF NI-SUC AND I-SUC 
IN SMARTFUSION®2 SOC FPGA TECHNOLOGY 
 
SUC 
Design 
Resources Area Usage in %          
for M2S05 
Usage in % for 
M2S150 
NI-SUC LUT 212 3.49 0.14 
DFF 72 1.18 0.05 
I-SUC LUT 226 3.56 0.14 
DFF 72 1.18 0.05 
 
TABLE III 
SUC TEMPLATES SOFTWARE COMPLEXITIES 
 
SUC  
Design 
Code size 
Overhead 
(Bytes) 
FPGA Memory Utilization (%) for 
M2S0xx 
10/25/50/60 90/150 
eNVM eSRAM eNVM eSRAM eNVM eSRAM 
NI-SUC 1152 272 0.43 0.41 0.21 0.41 
I-SUC 896  272 0.34 0.41 0.17 0.41 
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program and data should be accommodated completely within 
the target SoC device for highest security.  
A. Software Memory Complexity 
Assume that the GENIE would be allowed to insert a 
bitstream manipulator tool that can manipulate the 
configuration bitstream. The bitstream to be manipulated 
contains an application core design together with the SUC 
templates. The software GENIE contains:  
• A Configuration Bitstream Manipulation Tool (BMT) 
• Mappings storage: such as the class of optimal S-Boxes  
The memory complexity of the GENIE is described as follows: 
c BMT SMSW C C= +  
Where 
BMTC denotes the memory complexity of the bitstream 
manipulator tool which need to store all templates address 
locations. 
BMTC  is relatively small in most cases.  SMC  
represents the major memory complexity of the stored 
mappings. Each S-Box consumes 64 bits, for example storing 
the total set of optimal involutive S-Boxes in the software 
GENIE requires 8.90625 SMC Mbits= .  
B. Hardware Complexity  
When the GENIE is realized inside a system controller as that 
of SmartFusion®2 SoC FPGA, the overhead hardware 
complexity is expected to be negligible since all required 
actions can be realized by BMT. 
C. Time Complexity 
During the personalization, the GENIE selects random 
mappings and then manipulates the configuration bitstream 
accordingly. This requires getting random number from the 
TRNG. The required number of bits from the TRNG for I-SUC 
and NI-SUC are -I SUCTRNG  and -NI SUCTRNG  respectively: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
17.15
- 2 2
20.4
- 2 2
16 log 2 log
16 log 2 log
 =  +

=  +
I SUC I
NI SUC NI
TRNG RKSA
TRNG RKSA
 
This results with:  
- 156 Bytes=I SUCTRNG  and - 170 Bytes=NI SUCTRNG  
It is expected that, the TRNG can generate the required number 
of bytes in real-time. Otherwise, such small number of random 
bits can be generated and stored in a dead-time before running 
the personalization process to save latency time in the 
enrollment phase. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
A novel concept allowing self-creation of unknown cipher 
modules in SoC NV-FPGAs is presented. Such created so 
called Secret Unknown Cipher (SUC) converts the hosting 
device physically into a non-replaceable or hard to clone unit. 
The concept is based on pre-compiled cipher templates in the 
FPGA’s bitstream to avoid design-rules violations. Two cipher 
classes with cardinalities exceeding 21000 are proposed.  A non-
involutive and an involutive cipher classes. A prototype 
implementation in Microsemi SmartFusion®2 SoC FPGA 
technology is evaluated for both ciphers. The proposed concept 
shows also the feasibility of self-creation process of unknown 
functions as a paradigm towards future trends in a technology-
oriented cryptography. The attained sample practical security 
levels and area complexities are very promising. Even when the 
required FPGA infrastructure for such techniques are not 
available today, it is shown that the necessary FPGA-changes 
seem to be feasible in future NV-FPGA technologies. Many 
other new promising application proposals deploying the same 
new paradigm are in progress. 
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